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SUMMARY To offer location based services, service
providers need to have access to Location Information (LI) re-
garding the users which they wish to serve; this is a potential
privacy threat. We propose the use of constraints, i.e. statements
limiting the use and distribution of LI, that are securely bound
to the LI, as a means to reduce this threat. Constraints may
themselves reveal information to any potential LI user — that
is, the constraints themselves may also be a privacy threat. To
address this problem we introduce the notion of a LI Preference
Authority (LIPA). A LIPA is a trusted party which can examine
LI constraints and make decisions about LI distribution without
revealing the constraints to the entity requesting the LI. This is
achieved by encrypting both the LI and the constraints with a
LIPA encryption key, ensuring that the LI is only revealed at the
discretion of the LIPA.
key words: Multimedia location-based service, mobile security,
privacy.
1. Introduction
As devices used for wireless communication become in-
creasingly ubiquitous and mobile, it is becoming appar-
ent that location based services will play an important
role in the evolution of ambient networking. Location
based services use location information (LI) to allow
an LI subject (the entity concerning which LI is being
created) or some other entity to exploit this informa-
tion to support the provision of one or more services.
These range from allowing an emergency service to lo-
cate an LI subject, as is the case with E911 in North
America [1], to an authentication service based on the
location of an LI subject [2]. Location based services
are also likely to play a significant role as a vehicular
technology [3], including the support of navigational
services and toll schemes.
Current technologies used to generate LI include
various forms of Global Positioning System (GPS) [4],
and Enhanced Observed Time Difference (E-OTD) [5]
technologies. GPS uses satellites to enable the calcula-
tion of the LI of an LI subject. E-OTD calculates LI
by observing time differences in transmissions between
a user device and a base station. Unfortunately, LI may
also be used for malicious purposes. For example, an
entity could use LI to stalk an LI subject. Another un-
desirable use for LI is location-based spam [6]. These
are unsolicited messages sent to a device based on its lo-
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cation [7]. We define privacy as the controlled distribu-
tion of personally identifying information. Securing the
privacy of LI is an issue which needs to be addressed in
order to gain the trust of the mass market for such ser-
vices. Only those authorised by the LI subject should
be able to gain possession of LI. With this in mind, this
paper introduces LI constraints as a means of allowing
an LI subject to exert control over the distribution of
its LI. In the context of this paper, LI constraints are
simply rules associated with a specific piece or set of
LI, restricting the ways in which the associated LI may
be used and/or disseminated. To be effective, the con-
straints must be bound to the associated LI, typically
by cryptographic means when the LI is in transit, and
by access control techniques for stored LI.
LI constraints can be used to help manage the use
and distribution of LI. We begin by investigating the
possible constraint requirements of an LI subject, and
discuss how these may be fulfilled. By looking at vari-
ous uses for LI we investigate restrictions which may be
placed on these uses. Although constraints may allow
an end user to have some degree of control over its LI,
placing constraints on LI also allows an entity to gain
additional knowledge about the LI subject. We discuss
the various limitations of using constraints and look at
some simple methods to avoid such problems.
The fact that constraints may themselves be re-
garded as personal information motivates the design
of a scheme proposed in this document. This scheme,
called the Location Information Preference Authority
(LIPA), enables the end user to take advantage of loca-
tion based services, and also control the way LI is used,
stored and distributed. A LIPA is essentially a trusted
party which helps control the distribution of LI and
accompanying constraints. LI is distributed to service
providers in the form of an LI token. The LI token in-
cludes LI securely bound to its constraints. The LI and
constraints are also encrypted using the LIPA’s private
key, ensuring that unauthorised entities cannot see this
information.
Finally, we discuss further work which may aid the
wider use of multimedia location based services.
2. Previous work
In previous work, a variety of different aspects of secu-
rity for location based services have been considered.
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Existing schemes for LI privacy are in many cases
geared towards the available wireless technology archi-
tectures. These include IEEE 802.11 [8] networks, mo-
bile IP [9] and GSM networks [10].
Myles et al. [11] describe constraints which may be
used to control the distribution of location information,
although they do not describe cryptographic protection
mechanisms to provide privacy. A user registers their
privacy requirements with a location server, referred to
as LocServ. Entities which require location information
make requests to the LocServ, providing their own pri-
vacy policies. Based on this, the LocServ can then make
a decision whether or not to provide location informa-
tion. This mechanism does not provide any means for
entities to pass on information to other entities.
Aura et al. [12] investigate authenticated location
information in the Mobile IPv6 protocol. Aura et al.
see authenticated location information as a defence
mechanism against false routing information, which
could lead to other forms of attack. The subject of
authentic location information is also discussed in [13].
The discussion in this latter paper concerns the location
of GSM devices. The motivation is to support location-
based access control mechanisms and the inclusion of LI
in audit logs. By contrast, the primary objective of this
paper is the privacy of personal location information.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) geo-
priv working group is developing a general model for
the protection of location information [14]. This model
is primarily concerned with securing the Location Ob-
ject (LO), which encompasses location information and
other necessary information which may include con-
straints. They describe a general model which ad-
dresses the security requirements for such an object,
encompassing a variety of scenarios. Our LIPA model
looks at a specific scenario for a generally distributed
LI token containing constraints and LI.
3. A model for the use of LI
We next define the entities involved in a location based
service architecture. The relationships between the var-
ious entities are also described.
• LI subject. An LI subject is the entity about
whom location information is being gathered, man-
aged and used. This entity is most commonly a
human user.
• Malicious Party This is an entity with malicious
intent. A malicious party may act as a threat to
the confidentiality, integrity or availability of LI for
one or more LI subjects.
• User Device (UD). This entity is a device with
which the LI subject may interact, e.g. to invoke
a location based service. Such a device may either
be static, e.g. a desk top computer, or more typ-
ically mobile, such as a mobile phone or Personal
Digital Assistant (PDA). It is, in fact, this device
regarding which LI is generated rather than the
user him/herself, since there is typically no way to
directly measure the location of individuals. Thus
this entity is a key part of the model.
• Location Information (LI). This is data which
provides information regarding an LI subject’s lo-
cation. LI may occur in many forms. In general,
we can divide LI into two types, namely Inferred LI
and Actual LI. Actual LI refers to a directly cal-
culated geographical location. This type of data
indicates, to some degree of accuracy, the physical
location of an LI subject. Inferred LI is, by con-
trast, obtained by implication. For example, if a
user is present on a network, this implies that they
are likely to be within an certain vicinity, although
no specific calculation of geographical LI has taken
place. In this paper, when we talk about LI we re-
fer to actual LI. This type of LI is usually generated
by a specialist entity, which we call an LI gatherer
— see immediately below.
• LI gatherer. This is an entity which gathers or
possesses LI about an LI subject. A GPS receiver
is an example of an LI gatherer, as it obtains lo-
cation data. An entity in a GSM network which
keeps signalling data for a UD is also an example of
a LI gatherer. Although a GSM network does not
normally pass on this LI (except in certain special
cases), it certainly possesses such information, and
could, in an appropriate environment, be a valu-
able source of LI for commercial use.
• Location Based Service (LBS) Provider.
This entity provides a service, based on LI. This
could be a multimedia location based service e.g.
a vehicular navigation, gaming or advertising ser-
vice.
• LBS directory. This entity provides information
regarding the LBS providers which are available
for use by a particular user. The LBS directory
may itself use LI regarding the service consumer
when providing the service. For example, it may
show a service requestor lists of LBS providers pro-
viding information about particular types of retail
premises in the area of the requester.
• Network Entity. This is a component which pro-
vides a network service to a UD. Two important
types of Network Entity are the local base station
which provides network access to the UD, and the
UD’s ‘home network’ with whom the UD owner
has a contract and charging arrangement for the
provision of network services.
• Regulator/Legal authority. This is an entity
which exerts legal or regulatory control over the
management and use of LI. This includes telecom-
munications regulators, data privacy authorities,
law enforcement bodies, and auditors.
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When we talk about the abuse of LI constraints,
we define this as any use, distribution or storage of LI
which contradicts the rules defined by the constraints.
User Device
LI Gatherer
LI Gatherer
Network Entity LBS Directory
LBS Provider
Entities which may be found in one location
Wireless communication Wired communication
Key
Fig. 1 Mobile scenario for location-based service provision
Figure 1 shows an example of how entities can
interact when the user device has wireless capability.
Equally, a non-mobile scenario is possible where enti-
ties are connected by wire. The malicious party may
compromise any entity and may also compromise the
communications medium. The regulator/legal author-
ity may exert its control over any entity.
4. Using constraints with LI
In order to set constraints on LI we must first look
at how an LI subject may want to restrict the use and
distribution of LI. In addition, these constraints should
be in some common format which is automatically pro-
cessable.
4.1 Constraint types
We first look at the types of LI constraint which may
be required.
4.1.1 Storage time constraints
Storage time constraints may be used to limit the du-
ration that an entity can store LI. This can be done in
two ways.
One method is to use time stamps. A time stamp
can be used to record the time of creation or the ex-
istence of information [15, p3]. By adding a validity
period, a statement can be made that an entity should
not hold LI subsequent to its expiry. For example, the
LI subject may state that an entity cannot use LI once
one hour after the time set by the time stamp has
elapsed. The use of time stamps requires additional
security mechanisms. Time stamp protocols require
synchronisation and secure time clocks [15, p3]. Also,
there should be secure mechanisms to obtain them. The
fields needed for such a constraint would be the issue
date/time and the validity period.
Another way of adding time constraints to LI is
by stating the time at which LI expires. This may be
in the form of a date and time after which LI cannot
be held. This would eliminate the need for a secure
time stamp. The entity receiving LI will, however, need
access to a secure clock in order to learn when LI is
invalid. The field necessary for this scheme would be
the expiry date/time.
4.1.2 Distribution constraints
The LI subject may also want to constrain the distri-
bution of LI. Distribution constraints can be specified
inclusively or exclusively. Inclusive constraints would
specify the entities who are permitted to possess LI.
Exclusive constraints would indicate the entities who
are not permitted to possess LI.
Consideration should also be made with regard to
the way in which LI distribution is managed, and which
entity is accountable for misuse of LI. This could be the
entity which sends LI to an entity who is not permitted
to receive it, or it could be the entity which receives and
then stores LI when it is not permitted. Of course hav-
ing both sender and receiver responsible for protecting
LI would be most desirable, to ensure that the proba-
bility of misuse being prevented, or at least detected, is
maximised.
4.1.3 Usage constraints
An LI subject may want to place constraints to restrict
the way in which their LI is used. Difficulties when
constraining usage arise when attempting to enumerate
all the different applications of LI, because of the wide
range of possible uses. An attempt to classify the main
possible uses of LI is given in section 4.3 below.
4.1.4 Accuracy constraints
In some scenarios, it may not be necessary to provide
very accurate LI. Also, an LI subject may not want en-
tities to have particularly accurate LI. For example, a
directory service may only need the vicinity of the LI
subject to provide information about local restaurants.
The accuracy of LI may be degraded prior to it being
passed to an LBS provider, if required by the LI sub-
ject. The level of degradation may also be set by the
LI subject.
4.2 Gathering restrictions
Restrictions may be placed on the LI gatherer, pre-
venting it from creating an LI token for a particular
subject in specified circumstances. Clearly, this will
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prevent any requestor of LI from receiving LI contra-
dicting these restrictions. This type of restriction does
not need to be included in any constraints; however it
is necessary for the LI gatherer to know the nature of
any restrictions specified by the LI subject. Examples
of such restrictions are described below.
4.2.1 Time restrictions
The LI subject may want to limit when LI may be gath-
ered. For example during working hours an LI subject
may want their employer or colleagues to be able to lo-
cate them. However, outside these hours the LI subject
may not want to be locatable.
4.2.2 Location restrictions
An LI subject may not want LI to be generated at cer-
tain locations. As previously, the LI subject may want
his or her employer or colleagues to be able to locate
them when they are in the work place; however, when
they leave the work environment, they may not want
to be locatable.
4.3 Uses of constraints
The use of LI can be sub-divided into two main types.
LI can be used to:
• provide the LI subject with a service or with loca-
tion details, or
• provide a service or location details to a separate
entity.
The LI subject may, of course, not wish other enti-
ties to gain access to its location information, and hence
may use constraints to limit uses of LI falling into the
second category.
The two main types of constraints may be further
divided if an LI subject wishes to be more specific about
the purpose for which their LI is to be used.
5. Limitations of constraints
Once an entity other than the LI subject has posses-
sion of LI, it is difficult to force them to abide by the
constraints which have been set.
5.1 Difficulties in preventing and detecting constraint
abuse
LI is data, and the constraints which may be set on
it do not physically prevent the receiving entity from
misusing it. What adding constraints does do, how-
ever, is to allow entities to know the wishes of the LI
subject. A regulatory authority which oversees the way
in which other entities handle constraints may go some
way towards preventing constraint abuse.
Another problem which arises when considering
the use of constraints is proving their abuse. We have
already established the difficulties of preventing the
abuse of constraints with LI; it is also difficult to prove
an entity has abused LI.
5.2 LI constraint predicaments
The aim of using constraints with LI is to enable an LI
subject to dictate its use. Applying constraints to LI
may, however, lead to further security issues.
When a user applies constraints to LI, they give
information which indicates how, or how not, to use
the LI. Although this information may be necessary to
prevent the misuse of LI, applying constraints means
that further information is divulged to the receiving
entity. Two examples of this are now discussed.
5.2.1 Time constraint predicament
Two potential schemes for time constraints were men-
tioned in section 4.1.1. One made use of a validity
period for the constraints. The other is where the con-
straints are valid until a specified point in time.
The first scheme makes use of a time stamp which
is added to the constraint. This allows a receiving en-
tity to calculate the time at which a user was at the
location shown by the LI. This may, in some circum-
stances, be undesirable. Of course, in most cases, the
entities who are likely to receive LI are in all probabil-
ity trusted by the LI subject, and so the fact that they
know that a user was at a location at a particular time
should not be a problem.
The difference between this and the second scheme
for specifying time constraints is that, in the latter case,
a receiving entity is not informed precisely when the LI
subject was at a particular location. The delay be-
fore the receiving entity obtains the LI may only allow
an approximate location of the LI subject to be calcu-
lated. In some cases, LI may be used in real time and,
in such cases, the second scheme may be inadequate.
An example may be for a navigational service, where
the location and movement of the LI subject must be
calculated in order to provide the required information.
5.2.2 Distribution constraint predicament
If we place the responsibility for enforcing the LI con-
straints on the receiver of LI, then the presence of non-
permitted LI at an entity is evidence that this entity is
not acting within the constraints of the LI. Of course
the problem with this is that it is not possible to pre-
vent an entity from redistributing LI which it is not
permitted to see.
6. Combining constraints with auditability
Preventing misuse of LI is inevitably going to be a com-
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plex task. For an entity to be able to use LI, they must
have access to it. After an entity has seen the LI, they
thereafter can use or misuse it as they please. Even
when constraints are bound to the LI, an entity may
choose to ignore them or decide not to pass them on.
Instead of trying to prevent misuse of LI, which is
almost certainly an impossible task, we therefore pro-
pose the concept of auditability of LI. The idea is to
enable all users of LI to determine where LI originates
from, and to make all users accountable for their uses
of LI. To work effectively, the majority of LI users
must abide by the auditability rules, but this seems a
reasonable assumption (otherwise there is little hope of
achieving any control over LI). Of course, auditing will
not prevent abuse, but it does enable misuse to be de-
tected after the event, thereby acting as a deterrent to
misuse.
The notion of auditability introduced here requires
use of digital signatures. Every piece of LI, and its as-
sociated set of LI constraints, must be accompanied by
a digital signature computed over both the LI and its
constraints. That is, when any LI is generated by an
LI gatherer, then, as well as generating and attaching
the LI constraints, the LI gatherer must create a sig-
nature over the LI and the associated constraints. The
LI gatherer might also be required to include evidence
with the LI of how it was obtained, and include this
evidence within the scope of the signature.
Any entity receiving LI must verify the accompa-
nying signature, and must log an exception (and must
not use the LI) if the signature verification fails or if
the signature is not present. Moreover, all LI users
must check the constraints accompanying received LI
to determine whether they should be in receipt of the
LI — again, if they are not then an exception should be
generated and the LI should not be used. Finally, the
LI and the signature should be retained for auditing
purposes for a specified period of time.
We now consider how this combination of rules can
prevent (or at least make more difficult) the mishan-
dling of LI. First observe that the mechanism described
above does not address the misuse of LI, i.e. the use
of LI in ways prohibited by the LI constraints. It is
instead intended to address the issue of unauthorised
distribution of LI (after all, uncontrolled dissemination
of LI is probably the issue of greatest concern to most
LI subjects).
Suppose a malicious entity wishes to redistribute
LI in a way prohibited by the LI constraints. If the
entity simply sends it on as received, then the recipi-
ent will detect that the constraints have been violated
and the malicious entity can be held responsible for
the breach of constraints. Hence the malicious entity
will need to change the LI constraints. This, however,
will invalidate the original signature, and sending the
LI without a signature will also enable the recipient to
detect an LI use violation. Hence, if an entity wishes
to disseminate LI with modified constraints, then they
must sign the LI and indicate from where it was ob-
tained — this may present a major problem for a fraud-
ulent LI user. It will at minimum enable a subsequent
audit to detect exactly which entity was responsible for
disseminating unauthorised LI.
A further measure to restrict the ability to fraud-
ulently disseminate LI would be to limit the entities
capable of acting as LI gatherers and generating signa-
tures on LI. This is discussed further in section 7. If
an LI gatherer required a licence (e.g. in the form of
an attribute certificate) to generate signed LI, then a
malicious user without such a licence could not falsely
disseminate LI, except to other malicious users.
Clearly this notion of auditability is dependent on
industry co-operation and a regulatory body to ensure
that rules are obeyed.
7. A mechanism to provide security for con-
straints
In this section we introduce the LIPA mechanism, pro-
viding privacy control for LI and associated constraints.
7.1 Overview of the mechanism
In order to ensure that the information held within
the constraints remains private, we propose the use of
a trusted party which we call a Location Information
Preference Authority (LIPA). The LIPA is responsible
for deciding, based on given constraints, whether an
LBS provider is allowed to have the LI of an LI sub-
ject. The information sent to the LIPA is encrypted
in an LI token so that other entities cannot view it.
This allows general distribution of LI within the scope
of the LI token. The LI gatherer is assumed to be in
possession of the list of preferred LIPAs for each LI sub-
ject for which it generates LI. This is an indication of
the LIPAs trusted by the LI subject. The LI gatherer
must be trusted by the LI subject to act according to
its wishes.
1. LI gathering. The first step in our mechanism
involves the provision of LI by the gatherer. The
LI gatherer may be at any location, including in
the UD itself. The LI gatherer may obtain LI in
response to a request by an LBS provider or an LI
subject, or it may constantly collect LI for a large
number of LI subjects.
2. LI token generation. The LI gatherer then cre-
ates what we refer to as an LI token. This in-
cludes both LI and accompanying constraints. The
LI and constraints are encrypted by the LI gath-
erer using the public key of the LIPA. This ensures
that only the LIPA is able to view this information.
Also contained within the scope of the token is in-
formation which helps to identify both the LI sub-
ject and the LIPA, together with a unique token
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identifier. The LI token includes the signature of
the LI gatherer, guaranteeing the integrity of the
LI token. This also provides evidence to receiving
entities regarding the identity of the LI gatherer.
An LI gatherer may generate several tokens for the
same LI, e.g. if an LI subject uses two or more LI-
PAs. There is also provision for the inclusion of an
optional public key certificate for the LI gatherer’s
public key.
3. LI token distribution. When LI is required, an
LI token is provided to the LBS provider wishing to
use the LI for service provision. This could occur
in a variety of ways, e.g. by using third party LI
token repositories, by sending the LI token via the
UD, or by direct transfer from the LI gatherer to
the service provider.
4. LI token verification and decryption. Once
an LBS provider wishing to use LI receives an LI
token, it must submit it to the appropriate LIPA.
From the LI token the LBS provider can establish
the identity of the LI subject, the identifier for the
LI token, and the identity of the LIPA, but not the
LI or constraints since they are encrypted.
Upon receiving the LI token, the LIPA verifies the
signature and then decrypts the LI and the con-
straints and checks if access to LI is permitted for
the requesting LBS provider. If access to LI is per-
mitted by the constraints, the LIPA returns the LI,
the date/time of expiry of the LI and the identi-
fier of the LI token, all encrypted with the public
key of the LBS provider and signed by the LIPA.
If permission is denied, a message stating this is
sent to the LBS provider. Note that, as discussed
in section 4.1.4, the LIPA may choose only to send
part of the LI, or a degraded version of it, to the
LBS provider, if the constraints so specify. For ex-
ample, the LBS provider may only be authorised
to send LI accurate to at most 100 metres to this
particular LBS provider, in which case the LIPA
must reduce the precision of the LI before sending
it.
Figure 2 shows the LI messages which may be
transmitted in a mobile environment where the num-
bers correspond to the four numbered paragraphs
above. Stages 1 and 2 take place at the LI gatherer.
Stage 3 indicates the distribution of the LI token. In
stage 4, the LI token is sent to the LIPA by the LBS
provider, and LI may be provided in return.
7.2 Requirements for use of the mechanism
This section describes the requirements on the entities
involved in use of the mechanism.
The LI gatherer is the entity responsible for creat-
ing LI. It must possess a signature key pair. It must
also possess a trusted copy of the public encryption key
User Device
LI Gatherer
LI Gatherer
Network Entity LBS Provider
LIPA
3
3
3
3
3
3
44
1, 2
1, 2
Entities which may be found in one location
Wireless communication Wired communication
Key
Fig. 2 LI-related transmission for a mobile user device
for all the LIPAs used by the LI subjects for which it
generates/collects LI. These keys are used to encrypt
the LI and the constraints in the LI token. The LI gath-
erer must also be in possession of a reliable copy of the
constraints and LIPA preferences for each LI subject
for which it generates LI.
The LIPA entity must possess both a signature key
pair and an asymmetric encryption key pair. It must
also possess a trusted copy of the verification key of
every LI gatherer whose LI it needs to process, and a
trusted copy of the public encryption key of each service
provider to whom it might wish to provide decrypted
LI. (The need for LIPAs to hold public keys of LI gath-
erers and LBS providers can be obviated by requiring
LI gatherers and LBS providers to obtain and distribute
public key certificates).
Each LBS provider must possess a trusted copy of
the public signature verification key of each LIPA with
which it interacts. It must also possess an asymmetric
encryption key pair.
It is assumed that all the necessary encryption and
signature algorithms have been globally agreed before
use of the scheme.
7.3 LI creation
The entity responsible for generating LI is also respon-
sible for creating what we refer to as an LI token. At
the time of creation (or acquisition) of the LI, we sup-
pose that the LI gatherer generates accompanying con-
straints C based on pre-specified LI subject preferences.
The structure of the LI token is described below.
LI Token:
EeL(LI‖C)‖
IL‖IS‖TokenID‖IG‖
SG(EeL(LI‖C)‖IL‖IS‖TokenID‖IG)‖
[CertG]
where:
eX represents the public encryption key of entity
X; EeX denotes asymmetric encryption using the
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public key eX ; X‖Y represents the concatenation
of data items X and Y ; L represents the LIPA;
S represents the LI subject; G represents the LI
gatherer; IX represents an identifier for entity X,
e.g. IG denotes an identifier for the LI gatherer
G; CertG is the public key certificate of the LI
gatherer; [...] represents an optional data item.
The LI token is divided into four parts: the en-
crypted part, the plaintext part, the digital signature,
and the (optional) public key certificate of the LI gath-
erer. The encrypted section consists of LI and the con-
straints, C. These are encrypted using the public key of
the LIPA, eL. This ensures that entities other than the
LIPA cannot see this information. The plaintext part
consists of IL, IS , TokenID and IG. The identifier IL
identifies the LIPA whose public key has been used to
encrypt the LI and the constraints. This enables any
entity wishing to gain access to the contents of an LI to-
ken to determine which LIPA it can be requested from.
This identifier could take a variety of forms, e.g. a URL
or an IP address. The identifier IS allows any entity
to identify the LI Subject to which the LI in the to-
ken relates. This identifier may be a pseudonym. The
TokenID is an identifier which, in conjunction with
IG, enables an LI token to be uniquely identified. The
identifier IG allows any entity to determine which en-
tity generated the LI token. This also enables entities to
decide which public key to use to verify the digital sig-
nature. This identifier may also be a pseudonym. The
digital signature is computed over both the encrypted
and plaintext parts of the LI token. This provides as-
surance that the LI Token has not been tampered with,
and authenticates the entity which created the LI. The
certificate CertG may be optionally included in the LI
token. This makes it easier for LIPAs which commu-
nicate with many LI subjects to obtain the necessary
public keys.
Before proceeding, note that the encrypted part
of the LI token could alternatively be encrypted using
a symmetric encryption scheme with a shared secret
key. The major advantage of such an approach would
be that a symmetric encryption algorithm is typically
much less computationally intensive that an asymmet-
ric scheme. The main disadvantage is the key manage-
ment overhead, since such an approach would require
each LI gatherer to share a secret key with every LIPA
with which it ‘does business’. A variety of different
mechanisms exist to provide the necessary key man-
agement functions – see, for example, [15].
7.4 LI distribution
Section 7.3 describes the structure of an LI token.
When there is a request for LI, or when an LI subject
requests a service, the LI token is sent to the relevant
LBS provider.
LI Gatherer → P :
EeL(LI‖C)‖
IL‖IS‖TokenID‖IG‖
SG(EeL(LI‖C)‖IL‖IS‖TokenID‖IG)‖
[CertG]
where:
A→ B represents the communication of a message
from entity A to entity B; P represents the LBS
provider.
LI should always be distributed within an LI token, re-
gardless of who is sending the LI. The message above
describes direct communication of the LI token from
the LI gatherer to the LBS provider; however, as men-
tioned earlier, LI tokens may also be distributed via
third parties and between LBS providers.
7.5 LI use
This section describes how an entity uses an LI token.
When a LBS provider decides that it want to gain ac-
cess to the LI within an LI token, it must send the LI
token to the LIPA whose identifier is in the token, and
hence whose public key was used to encrypt the LI in
the token.
P → LIPA entity:
EeL(LI‖C)‖
IL‖IS‖TokenID‖IG‖
SG(EeL(LI‖C)‖IL‖IS‖TokenID‖IG)‖
[CertG]‖[CertP ]
The above indicates the LBS provider sending the LI to-
ken to the LIPA entity. The LBS provider may also op-
tionally include a certificate for its public key, to avoid
the need for the LIPA to possess a trusted copy of ev-
ery LBS provider’s public key. When the LIPA receives
the LI token, it must first verify the signature and de-
crypt the enclosed LI and constraints. If the signature
is invalid, or the token syntax is not as expected, then
the LBS provider must be sent the ‘Permission Denied’
message (see below). The LIPA must then check that
the LBS provider is permitted by the constraints of the
LI subject to receive this LI. The LIPA must also check
the authenticity of the LBS provider, which may be
based on the certificate provided by the LBS provider.
Details of a mechanism to provide this check for au-
thenticity are not discussed further in this document.
If the LBS provider is permitted to have LI, then it may
be sent. The structure of the message used to send the
LI back to P is described below. The LIPA also keeps
a record of the LI token and the entity to which it is
providing LI.
LIPA entity → P :
EeP (LI‖Expiry‖TokenID)
SL(EeP (LI‖Expiry‖TokenID))
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The message from the LIPA to the service entity con-
tains two parts: the encrypted part which contains LI,
Expiry and the TokenID, and the signature. The en-
crypted part is encrypted with the public key of the
service entity requesting the LI. This ensures that only
the service entity can read this information, prevent-
ing malicious parties intercepting data while in tran-
sit. Expiry is a time-stamp extracted from the con-
straints, and specifies when the LI expires, i.e. when
the LI should be deleted. This is the only informa-
tion from the constraints which needs to be sent to the
service entity. The TokenID allows the LI subject to
relate the LI received from the LIPA to the LI token
from which it has been taken. The digital signature al-
lows the receiving entity to check whether the message
has been tampered with during transit.
If the requesting entity is not permitted to have
access to the LI in the token then the following
PermissionDenied message is sent to the requesting
entity:
LIPA entity → P :
TokenID‖PermissionDenied
8. Billing
There are numerous ways the LIPA may generate in-
come for the provision of its service. The LIPA may
charge for each request for LI which it receives, or each
successful request for LI, i.e. when LI is sent to a LBS
provider by a LIPA. Also, billing may be per LI token
or per individual request.
The entities which may be billed for the LIPA ser-
vice are the LI subject and the LBS provider. Billing
the LI subject may result in a scenario where LBS
providers could request LI from the LIPA, which will
charge the LI subject whether or not the LBS provider
gives any service to the subject, and this is clearly
not desirable. Alternatively, billing the LBS provider
appears a more appropriate solution since the LBS
provider can recover the cost of obtaining the LI.
The LI gatherer (unless it is the LI subject
him/herself) will also typically require a means of ob-
taining payment for providing LI tokens. However, the
LI gatherer may have no obvious party to charge except
for the LI subject. In cases where the LI gatherer pro-
vides LI tokens for use by LBS providers not providing
services to the LI subject, this is probably unviable.
Another possibility might be for the LIPA entities to
pass on a percentage of the charges they make to LBS
providers to the LI gatherers.
9. Performance analysis
The scenario for our analysis in this section involves an
LI subject with a wireless UD who wants to receive a
service based on his or her location. We assume the
existence of a wireless network where the LI gatherer is
a network entity. The UD and the LI gatherer are ca-
pable of both transmitting and receiving wireless trans-
missions.
9.1 Assumptions
We suppose that encryption of LI token contents is
achieved by using a ‘digital enveloping’ technique. This
involves first generating a random secret key, K say,
which is used to encrypt the data (using a symmet-
ric encryption algorithm). The secret key K is then
itself encrypted with an asymmetric encryption algo-
rithm (using the public key of the intended recipient),
and sent with the encrypted data. For the purposes
of our analysis here we suppose that K contains 16
bytes, that symmetric encryption takes place using a
stream cipher, e.g. AES in counter mode [16], and that
asymmetric encryption uses 1024-bit RSA (e.g. using
OAEP) [16]. Hence, since we are supposing that sym-
metric encryption leaves the length of the data unal-
tered, enciphered data strings will always contain 1024
bits (128 bytes) more than the corresponding plaintext
strings.
The digital signature scheme used is also RSA with
a 1024-bit key see, for example [15], [16]). To generate
the RSA digital signature, the data is first hashed using
the SHA-1 hash algorithm [16]. This outputs a 160-
bit (20-byte) hash with any given input.
The LI gatherer is capable of generating RSA dig-
ital signatures, and performing RSA encryption. It is
also capable of generating a hash using the SHA-1 algo-
rithm. The LBS provider is capable of verifying digital
signatures and decrypting data. The LIPA is capable
of verifying and generating digital signatures, and also
encrypting and decrypting data. The LI gatherer and
the LIPA can also generate public and private key pairs
for digital signatures. The LBS provider and the LIPA
should be able to generate a public and private key pair
for encryption.
The length of the LI can be assumed to be 15 bytes.
This is a reasonable assumption as the LI in a 3G net-
work is 11 bytes, referred to as LOCI [17]. The LI sub-
ject identifier, IS , is assumed to contain 10 bytes. The
International Mobile Subscriber Identifier (IMSI) [17]
in a 3G network, used to uniquely identify mobile sub-
scribers, contains 9 bytes, so this is also a reasonable
assumption. The LIPA identity IL, the token identity
TokenID, and the LI gatherer identity, IG are all as-
sumed to be 5 bytes in length, which allows a large
number of unique identifiers. The constraints are as-
sumed to be 800 bytes long. This is approximately the
size of an XML schema with 17 lines. As we see below,
this means that the total size of the LI token in this
scenario is 1096 bytes (943+25+128).
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9.2 Storage requirements
For this scenario, we assume that LI tokens are gener-
ated upon request. This means that the LI gatherer is
not required to store LI tokens. The LI gatherer must,
however, obtain the 1024-bit public keys of LIPA enti-
ties to which it sends LI tokens. These may be stored
by the LI gatherer or acquired when necessary. The
LI gatherer must hold the constraints for each LI sub-
ject to which it provides a service. This is necessary to
generate the LI token.
When the LBS provider receives the LI token it can
decide if it requires the LI from the LI subject based
on its stored policies. These policies may list the LI
subjects which have subscribed to a service; they may
also specify the LI subjects to which a service should
not be provided. If the LBS provider successfully re-
ceives LI from the LIPA it may also store the LI until
the specified expiry time.
The LIPA may also store policy information. This
could include information about the LI subjects to
which it provides service. These stored policies may
also hold information about the activities of various
LBS providers. This helps the LIPA’s decision making
process when deciding if it should send LI to an LBS
provider.
9.3 Message exchanges
The processes and data transfer requirements are sum-
marised below. We start by describing the LI gatherer.
After receiving a request for LI, it must perform the
following tasks.
1. Encrypt the 815 bytes of data (800 bytes for the
constraints and the 15 bytes of location data) us-
ing the RSA-based digital enveloping technique
with the 1024-bit public key of the LIPA. This
will result in an encrypted block of data containing
815+128=943 bytes.
2. IL, IS , TokenID and IG, a total of 25 bytes of
data (10 bytes for IS and 5 bytes for each of IL,
TokenID and IG), are then concatenated with the
encrypted data described above. This will result in
a data string containing 968 bytes.
3. Generate the SHA-1 hash of the encrypted data
and the identifiers, and then generate a digital sig-
nature over this hash using the 1024-bit signature
key of the LI gatherer. The resulting signature will
contain 128 bytes. The concatenation of this with
the identifiers and the encrypted data will result
in a 1096-byte LI token.
The LI token is then sent to the LBS provider.
When the LBS provider receives the LI token it decides
if it requires LI from this LI token. If this is required
it then sends the 1096-byte LI token to the LIPA.
At the LIPA:
1. The LIPA first verifies the signature contained in
the LI token.
2. The ciphertext in the LI token is then decrypted.
Based on the constraints found in the resulting
plaintext, the LIPA then decides if the requesting
LBS provider is permitted to receive LI. If permit-
ted, it may be necessary to degrade the accuracy
of the LI, depending on the constraints.
3. The LIPA must then encrypt the data to be sent
to LBS provider. The data to be encrypted in
this case will be the 15 bytes of LI, and approxi-
mately 100 bytes for the constraints, as the expiry
time will be the only data from the constraints
to be sent. This is sent together with the 5 byte
TokenID. This is a total of 120 bytes of data to
be encrypted, resulting in 248 bytes of ciphertext.
4. The above 248 bytes are then signed, resulting in
a 128 byte signature. The resulting 376 bytes is
then sent to the LBS provider.
When the LBS provider receives the data, it first
verifies the signature and then decrypts the data. The
LI from this data is then used to provide service to
the LI subject. This data may be stored by the LBS
provider until the specified expiry time.
10. Security analysis
In this section we describe how our mechanism ad-
dresses control and privacy issues for LI. We also de-
scribe certain remaining issues with the mechanism.
These could provide suitable topics for further research.
The primary aim is to provide a mechanism which
enables the control of access to LI and constraints, en-
abling a greater degree of privacy without divulging
extra personal information. By enabling the LIPA to
make decisions based on constraints, untrusted entities
do not gain access to the information found in con-
straints or LI. However, this does mean that the LIPA
has access to both the constraints and the LI. Should
the LIPA be compromised, the malicious party would
have access to both the LI and the constraints of any
LI subject using its services.
Once an entity is in possession of LI, maintaining
control of this information is a difficult task. Ensur-
ing that LI is managed according to the preferences of
the LI subject once an entity possesses it, can only be
based on trust. Our mechanism aims to provide LI only
to entities which can be trusted, giving the LI subject
control over their LI. Of course, even trusted entities
cannot be trusted all the time and once these trusted
entities have this LI, the LI subject can only rely on
a regulatory or legal authority to ensure that messages
are being transmitted in the manner which has been
previously agreed. If an entity wishes to redistribute
the LI of an LI subject, it should only distribute the LI
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token. If it chooses to redistribute LI in other forms,
then this can only be addressed by some form of polic-
ing, e.g. through peer enforcement. Of course this pro-
tection could be enhanced by a regulatory authority,
which would ensure that rules are being adhered to.
Auditability should allow the identification of en-
tities acting in violation of the rules set by the con-
straints. To prevent unauthorised distribution of LI,
its origin, i.e. the entity responsible for generating the
LI token, must be verifiable. In addition, users of LI
must be accountable for its use. Therefore, if a mali-
cious entity redistributes LI in a way prohibited by the
LI constraints, the recipient will detect this, and the
malicious entity can be held responsible for the breach
of constraints.
11. Conclusion
This document addresses the issue of control and pri-
vacy of LI and associated usage constraints by intro-
ducing a trusted third party based framework. We have
introduced a mechanism which gives the end user the
ability to control their LI without having to divulge
additional personal data.
Although attaching constraints has the advantage
of allowing entities to see the requirements of the LI
subject regarding LI, in doing so it also allows them to
see additional information which may breach the pri-
vacy of the LI subject. It is also difficult to ensure
that entities abide by the constraints which are set by
the LI subject, and to prove when the constraints have
been abused. Finding ways to address such issues is an
important research challenge.
In order to enable a wide use of location based ser-
vices it is important to have a single language for the
specification of LI. This should allow LI to be gener-
ated, transferred and used on a wide variety of plat-
forms.
Currently the most promising means of achieving
a universally recognised means of specifying LI would
be to employ an appropriately devised XML schema.
XML (Extensible Markup Language) [18] is a language
for data exchange between different devices. It allows
data to be shared regardless of programming language
or operating system, making it a strong candidate for
use with location based services and to describe LI.
If LI is described in XML, it should be possible to
also describe constraints in XML, giving similar ad-
vantages. XML can also be used to create digital sig-
natures, which may be used to support the auditing
scheme mentioned above.
Location is just one aspect of a context-based ser-
vice. A context-based service is one in which the con-
text of an application automatically initiates some ac-
tivity. Examples of possible contexts other than loca-
tion include temperature and special events. Of course
different forms of context have different security as-
pects. For example, the temperature of a subject’s en-
vironment may not be private data; however, the end
user’s personal blood temperature may be private. As
with location information, it would be necessary to sub-
ject such data to distribution and use constraints. This
would mean extending the constraints described here
to different contexts.
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